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Abstract| Socioeconomic status (SES) is associated with both health (physical and mental) and cognitive 
ability. Understanding and ameliorating the problems of low SES have long been goals of economics and 
sociology; in recent years, these have also become goals of neuroscience. However, opinion varies 
widely on the relevance of neuroscience to SES-related policy. The present article addresses the 
question of whether and how neuroscience can contribute to the development of social policy 
concerning poverty, and the social and ethical risks inherent in trying. I argue that the neuroscience 
approach to SES-related policy has been both prematurely celebrated and peremptorily dismissed, and 
that some of its possible social impacts have been viewed with excessive alarm. Neuroscience has 
already made modest contributions to SES-related policy and its potential to have a more effective and 
beneficial influence can be expected to grow over the coming years. 
 
[H1] Introduction 
 
Poverty exists throughout the world and its prevalence in even affluent societies may be surprising to 
those unfamiliar with the statistics. In the US, for example, measured relative to the federal poverty line 
(an income corresponding to $25,100 to support a family of four1), 12.7% of the public live below the 
poverty line and 29.8% live on less than twice that amount2. These percentages are higher for children, 
with 18.0% and 39.1% living in poor and low-income families, respectively. Different countries use 
different definitions of poverty and direct comparisons are further complicated by many other social 
and economic differences between countries; however, recent surveys show that poverty by any 
reasonable definition is common across the globe3,4,5. Poverty reduction ranks among the top goals of 
many governmental and multilateral organizations, for compelling reasons: in addition to the obvious 
deprivations related to food, shelter and other basic needs, social science research shows that poverty is 
associated with shorter and less healthy lives, higher rates of mental illness and lower cognitive ability 
(Fig. 1a-c).  
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It is not only the poor who are afflicted by these physical and mental ills. Although risk for these 
outcomes is most concentrated among this group, it is present to a lesser degree for the near-poor and 
declines gradually as income rises6. Indeed, the recognition of these graded effects was a pivotal 
development in health disparities research, and in 1994 Adler and colleagues called on the field to 
confront “the challenge of the gradient”6. With the emphasis on understanding the gradient came a 
broadened conception of the factors that distinguish the poor from the affluent. In addition to income 
and other economic factors, social factors such as educational attainment and occupational status were 
found to cluster together with income and wealth, forming a construct known as socioeconomic status 
(SES). 
 
There is obvious mutual relevance between research on poverty and research on SES and the distinction 
between these concepts is not always prominently marked in discussions of such research. Furthermore, 
much of the literature considered in this article lumps together economic and noneconomic measures of 
SES and the range of deprivation varies across studies. In this Perspective, I will therefore adopt a 
‘lumping’ rather than ‘splitting’ approach to SES and poverty but note that more precisely characterizing 
these distinctions would be very worthwhile, especially with respect to policy7,8.  
 
Only recently have neuroscientists sought to understand SES. As shown in Fig. 1d, the neuroscience of 
SES emerged in the 21st century and has grown rapidly in recent years. The existing literature is primarily 
focused on elucidating the neural correlates of SES, their causes and their consequences for people’s 
lives. Many of the consequences of SES noted earlier and illustrated in Fig. 1 have links to the brain. 
Mental health and cognitive ability are obviously related to neural processes. Less obvious, but 
empirically well-established, is the role of the brain in vulnerability to physical illnesses such as heart 
disease, stroke, diabetes, arthritis and cancer, through its role in transducing and regulating stress and 
the endocrine and immune responses that ensue9,10. 
 
Large organizations with poverty reduction agendas, such as the World Bank11 and UNICEF12 have taken 
note of the neuroscience of SES. The most recent installments in a series on child development in low- 
and middle-income countries published by The Lancet make extensive reference to neuroscience and 
brain development13,14,15. In the UK and US, neuroscience has been brought to bear on child policy: in 
the UK, in two influential reports to the British government16,17 and, in the US, in the writings of 
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researchers affiliated with Harvard’s Center on the Developing Child18 (see Box 1). Neuroscience has 
even been embraced as a source of actionable poverty policy guidance concerning effective teaching19 
and economic betterment20. The hope that neuroscience will be of immediate, practical use against 
social problems is widely expressed in the popular press: for example, in 2016 Newsweek published an 
article on poverty21 that proclaimed “neuroscience has now linked the environment, behavior and brain 
activity—and that could lead to a stunning overhaul of both educational and social policies.” However, 
not all commentators have been so enthusiastic. The potential to use neuroscience in poverty policy has 
been criticized by some as unrealistic (e.g.22,23,24) and by others as laden with value judgements (e.g. 25,26) 
or as a dangerous diversion of attention away from social and economic injustice (e.g. 27).  
 
The goal of this Perspective is to assess the promise of neuroscience as a source of guidance on poverty 
policy. Before considering how and whether the neuroscience of SES holds practical promise, a short 
overview of the science will be provided. I will then consider whether it can help us understand how SES 
comes to be associated with so many important life outcomes and whether it can now, or in the 
foreseeable future, provide specific, actionable policy guidance. Finally, I will ask whether framing 
socioeconomic disparities in terms of brain science increases our willingness to help the poor or imposes 
particular social values on them.  
 
[H1] The neuroscience of SES 
 
Less than a decade ago it was possible to provide a complete accounting of the literature on SES and the 
brain in 7 pages28. With the field’s rapid growth, the state of the science is now challenging to present 
concisely; however, several recent reviews have aimed to do so (e.g. 29,30,31).  
 
Socioeconomic disparities in cognitive and emotional functions, from infancy through to old age, are 
being investigated using the tools of neuroscience. The literature includes studies using 
electroencephalography (EEG), event-related potentials (ERP) and structural and functional MRI29,30,31. 
These studies have aimed to characterize differences across levels of SES and to relate these differences 
to their potential causes as well as to differences in behavior, ability and wellbeing. Animal research has 
also been brought to bear on questions of causation, by testing hypotheses about the effects of factors 
that are correlated with SES in humans and the pathways through which SES differences become 
associated with brain differences9,32.  
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It has become increasingly clear that different life adversities affect brain development and function 
through at least partly different mechanisms. The effects of institutionalization are probably not the 
same as those of neglect33. Similarly, socioeconomic disadvantage (which itself is multifactorial and 
somewhat variable from context to context) is distinct from other risk factors, such as abuse and 
neglect34. Many adversities tend to co-occur but do not necessarily affect the brain in the same ways. 
Sheridan and McLaughlin34 have distinguished between the impacts of deprivation and threat, which 
presumably operate in different proportions in poverty and maltreatment, on different neural 
correlates35. Thus, findings on the effects of ‘adverse childhood experiences’36 or ‘cumulative stress’37, 
which are the subjects of larger and more established literatures, should not be assumed to generalize 
to poverty or low SES. 
 
Rather than attempting to summarize our accumulating knowledge about SES and the brain, I will here 
offer selected examples of the kinds of questions that have been asked, along with studies aimed at 
answering them (see 29 for a recent review). These examples were selected to illustrate the wide range 
of methods and samples used and to have relevance to different aspects of cognition and emotion.  
 
[H2]The neural correlates of socioeconomic status. One kind of question is a simple, descriptive one: 
does SES have measurable neural correlates and, if so, what features of the brain are correlated with 
SES? This question has been asked in studies of brain structure and brain function in children and adults, 
most often focusing on regional differences but increasingly also on networks. For example, by analyzing 
the structural MRIs of children and youth, a study by Noble and colleagues identified regionally-specific 
differences in cortical surface area as a function of both family income and parental education, with 
covariates including genetic ancestry38. When controlling for education and other covariates, significant 
effects of income on surface area remained in bilateral inferior frontal, cingulate, insula and inferior 
temporal regions and in the right superior frontal cortex and precuneus. Furthermore, the relationship 
between surface area and SES was shown to be strongest at the lowest SES levels; SES had a positive 
relationship with surface area at all levels of income and education, but the difference between poverty 
and near-poverty mattered most. 
 
Questions about qualitative differences in neural structure and processing have also begun to be 
addressed. On the one hand, SES might simply increase or decrease some aspect of the brain in tandem 
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with increasing and decreasing measures of ability or health.  On the other, it might moderate the 
relationship between brain and behavior such that individuals with higher and lower SES use their brains 
in different ways to perform the same tasks. As an example of findings supporting the latter possibility, a 
study that examined the neural correlates of children’s arithmetic processing found that SES moderated 
the relationship between behavior and brain activation: in children from higher SES homes, the activity 
of regions associated with verbal performance (including the left middle temporal gyrus) tracked 
mathematical ability, whereas in children from lower SES homes ability was more closely related to 
regions associated with spatial processing (including the right intraparietal sulcus)39. 
 
Another type of question addressed by neuroscientists studying SES concerns the psychological 
significance of SES-brain relationships: that is, whether the neural correlates are epiphenomenal or 
whether they account for at least some of the socioeconomic disparities in cognitive or emotional 
psychological measures. In many cases the relationship of SES to brain structure or activity either partly 
or fully accounts for the relationship of SES to psychological measures of interest. For example, one 
study performed structural imaging in a large sample of healthy young adults and assessed a set of 
personality traits linked to depression40. This revealed that the relationship between family SES and 
depression-related traits was partially accounted for by the volume of the medial prefrontal and the 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). Other studies have produced similar findings; for example, the study of 
SES differences in cortical surface area, mentioned above, also found that these differences could 
account for socioeconomic differences in cognitive outcomes38. 
 
[H2] Mechanisms linking socioeconomic status to brain function. Ultimately, the most important 
questions about SES and the brain concern mechanisms, and these are questions we are only beginning 
to ask, let alone answer. How does SES become associated with brain structure and function? Decades 
of debate in the social sciences regarding the psychological correlates of SES have shown that even the 
direction of causality cannot be taken for granted (Box 2). 
 
Mechanistic questions about SES are difficult to answer in part because SES is a distal factor. Income, 
education and other dimensions of SES are indices of risk but do not themselves directly impinge on the 
child or adult brain41. Rather, they are related to other, more proximal, factors, which have causal roles. 
These proximal factors include nutrition, toxin exposure, prenatal health, cognitive stimulation 
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(including linguistic interaction), stress, parenting behavior (particularly attentiveness and warmth) and 
the possible genetic differences associated with SES30,42,43,44.  
 
A growing number of studies in SES neuroscience have measured one or more candidate mediating 
factors and tested whether they can account, statistically, for some or all of the relationship between 
SES and brain structure or activity. For example, it was shown that mother-reported life stress and 
quality of parenting behavior (based on videotaped interactions between parent and child) together 
fully mediated the relationship between SES and hippocampal volume in children45. This is consistent 
with differences in stress and parenting practices being the proximal causes of this particular neural 
correlate of SES. Other human neuroscience studies have tested hypotheses concerning the causal 
factors linking SES and brain structure and function, and animal studies of specific proximal causes such 
as stress and other SES-correlated environmental factors can also be brought to bear (Box 3). 
 
Of course, identifying proximal physical and psychosocial factors gives us only a partial mechanistic 
understanding of SES and the brain. These factors are transduced by cellular and molecular processes, of 
which we have some general knowledge but not a well worked-out understanding in relation to SES. An 
exemplary step toward filling in such mechanisms was taken in a longitudinal study of stress-related 
methylation of the serotonin transporter gene in adolescents46. Across two time-points, teenagers with 
lower SES showed a greater increase in methylation than their higher SES peers and this was associated 
with greater amygdala reactivity and more depression symptoms. 
 
As the field learns more, questions about mechanisms are becoming more nuanced. For example, by 
what mechanisms of brain development does SES correlate with brain structure and function during 
different phases of childhood and adulthood and by what additional mechanisms of brain aging does SES 
manifest itself in the brains of older adults? Studying the relationship between SES and cortical thickness 
in children, an earlier and steeper decline among low SES participants was found47. The authors of this 
study suggested that this may be due to interactions between SES-linked differences in cognitive and 
linguistic stimulation and processes of synaptic pruning and myelination, which are responsive to 
experience and contribute to the thinning of the cortex. Additionally, they point to evidence that early 
life stress can accelerate brain development, potentially resulting in precocious thinning and, ultimately, 
the closing of sensitive periods for environmental influence48. In older individuals, who normally show 
cortical thinning, declines in white matter integrity and hippocampal volume loss, these effects are 
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magnified by low SES49,50,51.  Given the multifactorial nature of SES and the manifold nature of brain 
development and function, it seems likely that the neural correlates of SES emerge through many 
different mechanisms, operating at different ages and being responsible for different aspects of brain 
structure and function.  
 
[H1] Understanding SES disparities 
 
Can neuroscience contribute in any substantive way to our understanding of poverty and its 
accompanying disadvantages? Opinion is divided. Early efforts to integrate neuroscience with larger 
social issues surrounding childhood poverty evoked great enthusiasm at the time, but were also 
criticized for failing to connect the neuroscience to the social issues (Box 4) 
 
One advantage of the neuroscience approach to understanding socioeconomic disparities is evident 
even at this early stage: neural measures can reveal differences between higher and lower SES 
individuals that are not apparent in more traditional, behavioral measures. This is true even though the 
disparities we seek to understand are psychological and therefore more typically measured by behaviors 
such as task performance or survey responses. For example, in several studies ERPs have revealed SES 
disparities in the degree to which children filter out irrelevant sounds when paying attention in a 
dichotic listening task51,52,53. None of these studies found a significant SES-related difference in 
performance, even when performance was below ceiling, indicating that ERPs show greater sensitivity in 
these studies to disparities in attention compared to the concurrently collected behavior. The value of 
such measures is that a behavioral effect that is too small to be observed in a single laboratory testing 
session might nevertheless matter. It could have cumulative effects over time or larger effects in real 
world contexts. In other words, a larger sample of behavior or a sample from different tasks might 
detect disparities with as much or more sensitivity than the ERP methods used in these studies. No in-
principle superiority of neural measures over behavioral measures is being claimed here, merely the 
empirical observation that for some purposes, neural activity predicts outcomes better than traditionally 
used measures of behavior55. 
 
Another important advantage of neural measures in the study of SES disparities is their ability to reveal 
qualitative differences in brain as a function of SES, not just more or less brain activity, volume or 
cortical thickness, but different patterns of the brain measure in question. Behaviorally measured SES 
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disparities generally take the form of a positive correlation between SES and task performance, which is 
a simple quantitative relationship. The neural disparities follow the same trend in some cases, but in 
others the neural differences appear to be qualitative. In the study of children’s arithmetic ability 
mentioned above, for example, SES moderated the brain-behavior relationship, indicating that higher 
and lower SES children used different neurocognitive systems in performing the task, independent of 
level of performance39. As with the greater sensitivity of neural measures, the ability to reveal 
qualitative differences is not an intrinsic superiority of neural over behavioral approaches. In the 
example above, one can imagine behavioral research designs, such as a selective interference paradigm 
with verbal and visuospatial interfering tasks, that could lead to the same conclusion. Nevertheless, the 
insight about qualitative differences in arithmetical processing arose directly from the multivariate 
nature of brain imaging, which can characterize processes in terms of different brain regions as well as 
degrees of activation. 
 
The final, and most distinctive, advantage of using the concepts and methods of neuroscience to 
understand SES is that some of its relationships to psychological or behavioral outcomes may be, at root, 
neurobiological. This point can be made most clearly by beginning with an example of a psychological 
phenomenon related to SES that can be understood without recourse to neuroscience. The SES gradient 
in performance on standardized school achievement tests is such an example, in that we can at least 
aspire to explain it in terms of school quality, available role models for academic achievement and many 
other factors whose relations to SES and test scores can be couched in the language of ‘belief-desire’ 
psychology56. Although there are also proposed neural mediators of the SES school achievement 
relationship57,58, at present we do not know whether they add insight or predictive power beyond the 
psychological explanations. 
 
By contrast, some psychological phenomena may result from aspects of brain development and function 
that can be explained only in terms of biological facts. If described in brain-free terms, such phenomena 
will seem inexplicable, whereas when neural implementation is considered they will make sense in 
terms of a wider fabric of explanation. One category of examples concerns obviously biological factors 
with neural impact that are likely to have roles in explaining SES disparities in behavior and psychology. 
On the environmental side, these include prenatal and postnatal nutritional deficiencies and SES-linked 
exposures to environmental toxins59. They also include the synergisms of such factors with one another 
and with ostensibly nonphysical socioeconomic factors such as parental education60. Finally, those 
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expecting a role for genes in explaining SES disparities need not dig very deep to find fundamentally 
neurobiological mechanisms61. 
 
Even when SES disparities can be described in purely psychological terms, the mechanisms underlying 
them may be irreducibly neural. For example, the psychological stresses of low SES have long been 
known to be related to the higher incidence of depression symptoms in individuals at low levels of SES62. 
This is particularly true of stress experienced early in life, which raises the risk of depression throughout 
the lifespan63. Why is this? Reasoning on the basis of psychology alone, it is not apparent why the stress 
of low SES early in life would render someone more susceptible to feelings of depression later (as 
opposed to less susceptible or equally susceptible). Current research favors an explanation involving 
stress mediated disruptions to the development of prefrontal cortex, the hippocampus, amygdala and 
reward system structures that are needed for the regulation of mood and stress response throughout 
life64. The pathways through which early-life stress (not SES per se) affects the development and 
function of these areas are now understood with greater cellular and molecular detail based on studies 
in animals and humans9,65. Such studies have also highlighted the moderating role of parental care in 
buffering the developing brain from the effects of stress66 and such care has also been found to impact 
the effects of SES on hippocampal volume in humans45,67. The study methylation of the serotonin 
transporter gene in adolescents mentioned above is another example of the explanatory advantage that 
comes from neurobiological accounts of psychological phenomena46.  
 
Thus, although neuroscience research on the mechanisms of SES disparities is nascent, early findings 
demonstrate the ‘explanatory value added’ by neuroscience even for SES disparities in purely 
psychological traits. 
 
[H1] From knowledge to intervention 
 
Beyond its benefits to the scientific understanding of SES and the association of SES with myriad life 
outcomes, does the neuroscience of SES have real-world policy implications? Is it ready to guide policy, 
in the sense of counting in favor or against specific programs or practices? Here I use the term ‘policy’ to 
include not only governmental programs, but also official practice recommendations by professional 
groups (such as health professionals, educators, law enforcement, legal and human resource 
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professionals) and unofficial but nevertheless institutionalized practices involved in professional  
education and norms of professional practice. 
 
[H2] Current contributions of neuroscience to policy. One could argue that neuroscience can already 
guide policy, insofar as it provides additional converging evidence in favor of approaches already 
indicated by behavioral research. Examples include programs aimed at reducing child and parent stress 
and at increasing parenting skills68. This is certainly not the “stunning overhaul” heralded by Newsweek, 
but it is nevertheless a contribution. In policy-making, it is not only new and unprecedented ideas that 
matter; additional support for a familiar idea can tip the balance in decision-making and therefore be 
consequential. 
 
This approach may seem odd to those whose understanding of science is based on critical experiments 
designed to pit hypotheses against one another to see which one survives the attempt to falsify it. If we 
already know something with a high degree of certainty, what is the value of showing it in a new way? In 
answer, one can point first to the many ways in which null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) can 
mislead69. Second, there are broader issues of validity, including construct validity and external validity, 
which are particular challenges in the study of complex social and biological systems and which limit the 
generality of conclusions that can be drawn from any single method. There are generally irreducible 
gaps in the applicability of knowledge from any one study or method to the real world. As different 
methodologies tend to have different strengths and weaknesses, converging evidence across methods 
has value. 
 
The approach typically used for policy decision-making focuses on the ‘weight of evidence’ (WOE). In 
comparison to NHST, WOE is a less formalized approach to answering empirical questions related to 
policy and typically involves an intuitive synthesis of diverse evidence, including qualitative and 
quantitative data, the results of observational and experimental studies with humans or animals and 
even the results of in vitro studies70. As an example, we can consider a hypothetical new policy 
concerning pediatricians’ interactions with parents that suggests that pediatricians routinely ask parents 
about their stress levels and the methods they use to manage stress, and direct parents to therapy and 
support when stress is high or inadequately managed. It seems obvious that parental stress is not good 
for children and psychology research has already provided behavioral evidence that stressed parents 
have more troubled children71. However, given the costs of adding new procedures and responsibilities 
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to pediatric practice, a singular source of evidence for the benefits might not suffice to support such an 
intervention. The addition of new types of evidence from human and animal neuroscience studies could 
therefore add to the WOE supporting the value of addressing parental stress in pediatric primary care 
practice. 
 
Do the policy implications of neuroscience go beyond merely adding confirmation to our existing 
understanding of policy costs and benefits? At present, I believe the answer is no; however, given the 
short history of SES neuroscience and its rapid growth, this may soon change. Although innovation is, by 
nature, hard to predict, I have below tried to imagine some actionable neuroscience advances that 
illustrate the variety of ways in which neuroscience might eventually inform policy. 
 
 [H2] Prospects for the future: actionable insights from neuroscience As Pavlakis and colleagues have 
noted, a likely near-term application of neuroscience to policy is the use of measures of brain structure 
and function as biomarkers72. Projecting modestly from current scientific knowledge, it can be imagined 
that such measures could indicate risk for future cognitive and educational problems of the kind faced 
by children of low SES. This approach capitalizes on the properties of neural measures discussed earlier: 
these measures (which include relatively inexpensive and portable EEG-based measures) hold promise 
as more sensitive predictors than behavioral data.  Such biomarkers would be particularly valuable 
where preverbal infants and young children are concerned.  To the extent that interventions may be 
most effective for young children, this advantage of predictive biomarkers is all the more 
importantant72. 
 
In addition to their use in clinical or educational practice, such biomarkers would facilitate research on 
the efficacy of interventions. Analogous to the use of biomarkers as selection criteria or endpoint 
measures in clinical trials targeting preclinical Alzheimer’s disease73, appropriately validated biomarkers 
of SES disparities might serve as proxies and harbingers of later behavioral outcomes. Along these lines, 
interventions designed to help disadvantaged individuals have been studied with the help of 
biomarkers74,75. Proposed future intervention studies76 will incorporate EEG outcome measures and, in 
one ambitious plan77 to study and enhance child development among the poor of Bangladesh, will also 
incorporate functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) measures of brain activity. 
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A related policy benefit of neural measures comes from their ability to reveal qualitative differences in 
psychological processes as a function of SES. As noted above, studies have demonstrated different ways 
of performing arithmetic in children of higher and lower SES39. An accumulation of such findings would 
have implications for education policy. Specifically, in academic domains showing SES differences such 
findings would indicate that we should not assume that teaching methods that have been validated with 
one SES group will necessarily be effective for a different group. 
 
Research in developmental neurobiology may also deliver actionable insights in the foreseeable future. 
Consider prenatal brain development, which lays the groundwork for lifelong cognitive ability and 
emotional wellbeing. Although reducing stress, toxin exposure and nutritional deficiencies are good 
goals for any stage of life, the brevity of the prenatal period and our growing knowledge of the specific 
windows of prenatal time when particular interventions could help makes policies promoting prenatal 
neurodevelopment seem especially feasible and impactful78. For example, maternal SES has been shown 
to be related to prenatal stress-immune system interactions, which were in turn related to infant brain 
development in the first year of life79. Furthermore, early, but not late, pregnancy cortisol levels have 
been demonstrated to affect amygdala volume and child behavior at age 780.  
 
Concrete recommendations based on cellular mechanisms of brain development during childhood can 
also be envisioned. For example, the possibility (described above) that low SES might lead to a 
premature reduction of plasticity and consequent reduction of opportunities to learn47, if supported by 
additional research, would recommend that we seek potentially modifiable causes of this 
environmentally-driven precocity. These would plausibly include diet, endocrine disrupters and aspects 
of the psychosocial environment48,81. A surprising array of other influences on the timing of brain 
development, from neuromodulators governing the opening and closing of critical periods82 to the gut 
microbiome83,84, offer additional potential avenues of intervention. 
 
Finally, specific epigenetic changes associated with SES have been identified during prenatal and 
postnatal life46,85,86,87. An animal model of early life stress and parenting has been developed88, which 
specifies the pathways linking environmental stimuli to gene expression in the brain through a detailed 
molecular pathway. When and if we understand SES-linked epigenetic changes and their consequences 
for brain and behavior in comparable detail, we will be in possession of a wealth of potentially 
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actionable knowledge. This includes intervention targets in the environment or in combination with 
pharmacological therapies, as has been proposed for other indications89,90. 
 
By considering examples of policy actions that could conceivably follow from neuroscience in the future, 
we have entered the realm of science fiction. None of the possibilities sketched out above are feasible at 
present and some may await decades of scientific progress before they can finally be judged as viable, 
laughable, or something in between. However, this exercise in imagination serves a purpose: to 
illustrate the variety of ways in which advances in the neuroscience of SES could, in principle, lead to 
specific policy recommendations and the range of forms that such recommendations could take. 
 
[H1] Morality and politics 
 
Scientific theories can be controversial, and applications of science to real world human problems even 
more so. In the case of neuroscience and policy related to SES, the disagreements are not just about 
what’s true and what works; they are also about ways of viewing morally significant problems91. For this 
reason, contemporary policy discussions invoking neuroscience, such as those lead by the World Bank11 
or the Center on the Developing Child, are viewed as dangerous by some. To the extent that 
neuroscience discourse emphasizes certain aspects of social problems and their solutions, it can exert a 
powerful influence on public opinion and policy design. 
 
The potential dangers of neuroscience discourse in this context have been discussed by sociologists and 
historians of science working within a discipline known as ‘critical neuroscience’92. The term critical is 
used in this field in a non-derogatory sense to mean reflective, analytic and interpretative. These 
scholars have not, by and large, found fault with the science being cited in policy discussions. Rather, 
they have noted that certain values, allocations of responsibility and policy goals seem implicit in the 
framing of socioeconomic issues in terms of neuroscience. Below I summarize four of these critiques. In 
each case I attempt to convey what I consider the valid concerns raised by the critiques as well as the 
ways in which they may overstate the problems. 
 
[H2] Responsibility and blame. It has been suggested that neuroscience presents us with a description of 
a malfunctioning biological system rather than a morally wrong social arrangement. According to one 
critic, instead of confronting “issues of equity, power, and justice [we instead focus on] the impact of the 
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‘environment’ on brain function”93. Other critics have likened the neuroscience approach to “saying 
slavery is ... morally wrong because it impacts brains” and suggested that the focus on brains has 
implications for policy in that it eclipses social and economic policy targets, “effectively work[ing] to 
conceal the social forces—both the actual poverty suffered by people and the systemic effects and 
politics of inequality—from view”27.  
I would agree that the neuroscience approach does draw more attention to the brain than to social 
structures and justice, and that this could lead to the neglect of promising policy targets in society. For 
example, the neuroscience-inspired policy literature has much to say about parenting practices in low 
SES communities and parent training is a frequent policy recommendation94. However, it is important to 
consider the context in which parents are caring for their children. Food insecurity, the threat of 
homelessness and other stresses of poverty may well lead mothers to be preoccupied or depressively 
withdrawn and, as a consequence, they may behave toward their children in less than beneficial ways. 
Neuroscience-based arguments on the importance of early maternal responsiveness could divert 
attention from interventions targeting nutrition, housing and other needs, in favor of parent training 
programs. Such arguments could even be misunderstood as pointing the finger of blame at mothers of 
low SES. 
[H2] Essentializing low SES. Another concern is that neuroscience leads us to view low SES as a property 
of person or brain, rather than a situation, “re-inscribing social and economic differences into 
differences in brain architecture”95. Attributing the life failures of poor adults to epigenetic and other 
environmental effects on their brains may seem kinder than blaming them for laziness or labeling them 
hopeless because of their genes; however, as has been pointed out, it nevertheless categorizes them as 
biologically inferior96. It has been suggested that there is a small step from this to stigmatizing or (given 
the biomedical framing of neuroscience) pathologizing the poor27.  
It is my belief that we should neither essentialize poverty, viewing it as a property of certain people’s 
brains, nor stipulate that poverty can only be understood in terms of the extra-personal properties of 
society. In trying to understand people in their contexts, ignoring the person is as unenlightening as 
ignoring the context. Yes, it feels bad to talk about the causal contributions that suffering people make 
to their own suffering, even if those contributions are understandable and inadvertent. But if we cut 
short our analyses of the chains of influence at the point that those influences cross the boundary 
between world and person, we are imposing a large blind spot on our view of a complex causal network. 
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[H2] Values. A third criticism concerns the values embodied in neuroscience-based policy. One critic 
notes that “the discourse of brain science affirms middle-class values/lifestyles by invoking cultural 
practices and preferences specific to this group in the discourse’s explication of the ‘ideal’ environment 
for ‘stimulating’ neurological development”25. One education leader points out that the ways in which 
low SES students differ from other students are automatically labelled deficits and states “I am deeply 
concerned today that work in what I will refer to as applied neuroscience is making deficit claims with 
regard to language learning and executive control among populations of young people living in 
poverty”97. She suggests that there is more than one kind of good development and that developmental 
goals may vary across cultures and communities. 
 
Others perceive, in neuroscience-based policy discussions, the neoliberal economic values of human 
capital theory98. According this theory, economic development requires more than raw materials and 
money; it also requires people who are productive members of society — the ‘human capital’ of healthy, 
skilled and disciplined workers. Self-control and future-mindedness are traditional middle-class values 
that are also important forms of human capital, and they figure prominently in research on executive 
function development and SES99. Policies arising from this work may seem to place more value on raising 
productive workers than on human wellbeing. One critic writes of the “entrepreneurial forms of self-
governance” prioritized by neuroscience, and suggests that the goal is “babies emotionally primed to 
navigate an economic system that prioritizes flexible, mobile, and adaptable workers”26. These concerns 
shade into worries about social control, with another critic seeing “the discourse and practices of brain 
science extend[ing] and legitimiz[ing] the extension of Foucauldian governmentality over lower income 
populations, which are perceived as threatening social and state security”25. 
 
I would agree that the case for increased government support for low-income families is often framed in 
terms of economic development and social order. For example, the neuroscience-inspired Allen report 
in the UK summarized the benefits of early childhood intervention as “improvements in behaviour, 
reduction in violent crime, higher educational attainment, better employment opportunities and more 
responsible parenting of the next generation”16. And these were the noneconomic benefits, presented 
before the report’s economic case for investment in early childhood! Creating more productive and law-
abiding individuals is certainly in the state’s interest; however, it does not follow that these efforts 
deserve the negative connotations of social control. Furthermore, executive function can facilitate 
achievement of one’s personal goals, as well as, or even in opposition to, the goals of the state. There is 
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no necessary affinity between neuroscience and neoliberal ideals of humanity; neuroscience can in 
principle illuminate any aspect of human psychology and behavior.  
 
[H2] Fatalism. The brain’s critical or sensitive periods are frequently mentioned in the policy literature, 
and have been used to emphasize the importance of supporting early childhood development. However, 
the emphasis on prenatal and early postnatal development has led critics to warn of fatalism, which 
could lead us to write off the needs of older children and adults. In the words of one author, “If young 
brains subjected to deprived conditions, and to the inadequate parenting that often goes along with 
them, are irrevocably damaged – pickled in stress hormones, stripped of synapses – there is no time to 
waste, that is true. Yet such alarm, though it conveys urgency, can all too easily fuel defeatism... the 
case for subsequent help is bound to seem weaker.”100. 
 
In response, I would agree that a strong emphasis on critical or sensitive periods does indeed discourage 
efforts to help older children, teens and adults, given fixed resources. Of course, neuroscience is not 
alone in suggesting that earlier interventions will generally be more effective than later interventions; 
for example, economists have reached the same policy conclusion101. We may well feel uncomfortable 
with unequal distribution of help, such as the prioritizing of 1 year-olds over equally needy 10 year-olds 
or 60 year-olds. However, even if we recognize a moral obligation to help all needy people, the expected 
effectiveness of help at different ages is surely relevant to our decisions about resource distribution. 
Finally, it must be clarified that contemporary neuroscience does not support sharply defined critical 
periods for psychological development, and has only begun to understand age-related changes in 
plasticity102. Indeed, one of the most important insights of recent decades in neuroscience is the degree 
of plasticity that remains present in the adult brain103. 
 
[H1] Conclusions 
 
The neuroscience of SES is a young field (Fig. 1d). Many of the questions and controversies discussed in 
this Perspective can be traced to its fledgling status. This is certainly true of the scientific criticism that 
neuroscience knows too little about SES to be of use. It may even be true of the social, political and 
moral criticisms reviewed above. My own experience working on the neuroscience of SES has taught me 
that ideological criticisms are more likely to fasten onto schematic proposals and ‘in principle’ ideas than 
onto real empirical work in progress. Nevertheless, the social criticisms reviewed here raise worthwhile 
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considerations. The models and metaphors of science can implicitly influence policy choices in good or 
bad ways and, for that matter, existing policy preferences may bias the inferences we make from the 
science. These are reasons to de-silo and seek closer collaboration between neuroscientists and social 
scientists engaged in critical neuroscience104. 
 
Scientifically, we have only scratched the surface of the SES–brain function relationship, and many 
questions remain open. Which findings will replicate and generalize, and which will not? What can we 
say with confidence about the mechanisms linking SES and the brain? To what extent do the answers to 
these questions depend on specific dimensions of SES, such as income or neighborhood characteristics, 
or on poverty per se as opposed to gradations between higher levels of SES? Are individuals’ ages, 
genders and genotypes part of the answer? Do the same mechanisms underlie SES disparities globally; 
that is, do they apply in middle- and low-income countries as well as in the high-income countries in 
which most of the research has been conducted? Do they vary across cultures or ethnicities, or between 
urban and rural communities? There is little that we can now say with confidence. This is particularly 
true when we remember that findings on adverse experience more generally (including trauma, 
maltreatment and institutionalization) cannot be applied automatically to the understanding of 
socioeconomic adversity. Thus, our knowledge of SES and the brain remains quite limited. If we fail to 
appreciate the preliminary state of our knowledge, we risk the field’s credibility by promising too much 
and disappointing policy-makers and funders. We also risk premature translation of research findings 
into policy, which could harm the very people in need of help. 
 
Will neuroscience research on SES advance to a state of practical usefulness given time? In one critic’s 
view, “Neuroscience has little or nothing to contribute to addressing these problems [of low SES] and is 
unlikely to add anything of significance in the future”24. I believe that one reason to doubt this 
prediction is the multitude of ways that basic and clinical neuroscience have already found to shape 
brain development and function, with no obvious barriers to their eventual application to the problems 
of poverty.  Another reason to reject pessimism at this point is the very short time that neuroscientists 
have been studying SES. Depth of understanding and applicability take decades to emerge in any area of 
neuroscience and, in the case of SES, the work is all quite recent and being pursued in relatively few 
laboratories.  Nevertheless, our current knowledge is sufficient to frame new scientific hypotheses to be 
tested, boding well for the coming decade of basic research on SES and the brain. 
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In sum, at this early stage of development, neuroscience for poverty policy is positioned between 
enthusiasts and critics. In my view, enthusiasts often fail to recognize the scientific challenges ahead. 
whereas critics either dismiss the whole enterprise as unrealistic, based on early results from a nascent 
field, or see it as socially dangerous, based on the possibility that it could be used to justify harmful 
policies. Thus surrounded, neuroscientists studying SES will need to manage expectations in the coming 
years and, at the same time, assert the potential of this science for a positive impact on society. 
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Box 1 Simplifying models, metaphors and messages 
 
Harvard University’s Center on the Developing Child has been a leader in the integration of ideas and 
insights from neuroscience with child policy (e.g 18) and has introduced a number of influential 
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neuroscience-based concepts into public discourse on early childhood development. The director of the 
Center and his collaborators noted that public resistance to support for some programs might stem in 
part from preconceptions about human development and poverty more specifically105. To address this 
issue, they partnered with the FrameWorks Institute, a communications research firm that “develops 
simple and concrete metaphors that help people to organize information on issues in new ways, to fill in 
understanding currently missing from the public’s repertoire, and to shift attention away from the 
unproductive patterns they default to in understanding those issues.” To do so, the FrameWorks 
Institute “identifies, empirically tests, and refines explanatory metaphors for complex social problems”. 
 
Together the Center on the Developing Child and the Frameworks Institute developed a ‘core story’ of 
early childhood development. The story features neuroscience prominently in the form of what they 
term ‘simplifying models’ or ‘metaphors’: these include ‘brain architecture’ and ’toxic stress’105. This 
framing highlights the psychological needs of young children, even preverbal infants who might seem to 
need little more than food and shelter, by emphasizing the foundational role of early experience in 
building brain architecture. It also counteracts common assumptions about personal responsibility and 
the causes of poverty by emphasizing the “toxic stress” that accompanies adversities such as poverty 
and the effects of such stress on parents and children. 
The idea that socioeconomic disadvantage has physical consequences may impress upon laypeople and 
policymakers the seriousness of poverty’s effects and the benefits of prevention or intervention. Indeed, 
the effectiveness of this approach is illustrated by the comments of a focus group participant who, when 
presented with the physiological consequences of severe stress that might accompany deep poverty 
stated “...what really gets me from the study is that it could actually have a chemical or biological or 
some sort of impact on the child’s brain... Behavior is one thing, and attitude and personality is one 
thing, but if it can really negatively impact... the chemistry and the makeup of the brain––you can 
damage that that early––that’s really serious”105.  
 
Those sensitive to neuroscience over-reach might view the Center’s messages as implying a more 
detailed scientific understanding of human brain development in real world contexts than we currently 
have23. However, although the Center has made an unusual use of science for messaging, in my opinion it 
is not a misuse. Indeed, a number of eminent neuroscientists have worked with the Center on the 
Developing Child to ensure that the message, while simple and metaphorical, is not oversimplified or 
misleading. 
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Box 2 Correlation and causation 
 
Socioeconomic status (SES) is correlated with intellectual achievement and mental health106,107, 
but what pattern of causality underlies this correlation? Social scientists have long debated the 
direction of causality between SES and various behavioral traits108 and their answers fall into two 
broad categories.  
 
According to the theory of social causation, SES causes differences in cognition and emotion 
though environmental influences on the person108. In other words, SES causes its psychological 
correlates. Given the importance of cognitive and emotional development for academic and 
occupational success and emotional wellbeing, this would create a vicious cycle: a family’s 
poverty would causally impact the capacities needed for socioeconomic success in the next 
generation.  
 
According to the theory of social selection, however, psychological differences that are under 
genetic control cause SES differences through lowered educational and occupational 
performance108. In other words, psychological differences cause SES differences. Genetic 
transmission of psychological traits within the family cause children to develop the behavioral 
phenotypes associated with their family’s SES, which would explain the intergenerational 
stability of SES. Social scientists who hold a belief in social selection tend also to be skeptical 
about the effectiveness of interventions109: indeed a recent critique of the neuroscience of 
poverty questioned its practical utility, given the possibility that social selection is responsible 
for the neural correlates of SES24. Whereas harmful environmental effects can in principle be 
prevented by policies that eliminate the specific harms from the environment, it is less clear how 
to correct detrimental effects of genetic origin (although critics do note that some genetic 
diseases can be treated).  
 
In the relationship between SES and the brain, it seems likely that selection and causation both 
operate. It is hard to imagine how innately higher or lower abilities or greater or lesser emotional 
resilience would not encourage upward or downward drift in SES over a lifetime. Indeed, this 
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has been referred to as ‘Herrnstein’s syllogism’ for its seeming inevitability110. On the other 
hand, there is evidence from social science that SES causes at least some of its psychological 
correlates. 
 
The strongest evidence for social causation comes from ‘natural experiments’, in which SES is 
raised or lowered for reasons external to the subjects themselves111. For example, in the course of 
a longitudinal psychiatric epidemiological study of children in primarily low-income rural 
communities, a subset of the subjects began receiving unearned income supplements from the 
opening of profitable casinos in their communities112. This provided the equivalent of an 
experimental manipulation introduced part-way through the study. Fewer psychiatric symptoms 
were found in subjects from families that had received the income supplement, and this was 
particularly notable in those who were youngest when the supplements began. A recent follow-
up showed the same pattern in adulthood, with lower rates of psychopathology among those who 
received the supplements at younger ages113. In another study, adoption provided a quasi-
experimental test of environmental causation in the realm of intelligence114. This study examined 
the effect of adoption of one sibling to a higher or lower SES home on IQ in adolescence, with 
the nonadopted sibling of each adoptee as a comparison subject. The findings showed that the 
greater the SES increase of the adoptive family over the biological, the greater the IQ advantage 
of adopted child over sibling. 
 
Box 3 Establishing causality in the neuroscience of socioeconomic status 
 
In the effort to distinguish ‘mere’ correlation from causation, neuroscience has an advantage that 
is not shared by social science: the ability to experimentally manipulate the life conditions of 
animal subjects. Of course, animals do not have socioeconomic status (SES). However, many of 
the environmental factors that have been proposed to be proximal causes of SES disparities by 
social scientists can be manipulated in animals and have been shown to exert a causal impact on 
the brain32. For example, environmental stimulation has pervasive effects on brain structure and 
function115. Stress causes numerous molecular, cellular and anatomical changes in the brains of 
rodents and nonhuman primates9. Parenting behaviors are affected by environmental factors such 
as stress116,117 and play a causal role in buffering the effects of stresses experienced by the 
  31
offspring118. Although we do not yet know how detailed the parallels are between the neural 
effects of stimulation, stress and parenting in animals and the correlates of SES in humans, there 
is a broad-brushstroke similarity. If this similarity is not a reflection of some shared causal 
mechanisms, then it is a remarkable coincidence. 
 
Human neuroscience can also be brought to bear on the relationships between experience and the 
brain, albeit without the power of experimental methods to test causality. Some have examined 
the factors that statistically mediate the relationship of SES to brain function (e.g. 46).  For 
example, studies have shown that measures of stress or related measures of inflammation can 
account for the effects of SES on brain structure or function45,119,120,121,122 (but see 123 for an 
exception). 
 
A few human neuroscience studies have assessed the effects of interventions to improve the 
environment of poor children. Although these studies do not alter SES per se, they do manipulate 
some of the proximal factors by which SES is proposed to affect brain structure and function. 
Parenting interventions have been found to cause changes in attention and language processes 
reflected in event related potentials74 and to be associated with less hippocampal volume loss at 
long-term follow-up67. Comprehensive programs including early childhood cognitive enrichment 
have resulted in changed neuroendocrine function75 and later brain structure124. Ultimately, 
however, only a randomized controlled manipulation of SES can offer a definitive test of the 
causal effect of SES on the brain. It has recently been announced that such a study is being 
launched and will include an income intervention and neural as well as behavioral outcome 
measures76. 
 
Box 4 Neuroscience over-reach 
 
Many individuals and organizations have embraced neuroscience as a source of poverty policy. 
Others have been decidedly less enthusiastic. For example, in 1997 the education theorist John 
Bruer attended a White House conference on the topic of ‘Early Childhood Development and 
Learning: What New Research on the Brain Tells Us About Our Youngest Children’. According 
to Bruer, the program displayed the sparseness of the connections between neuroscience and 
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childhood disadvantage; only one neuroscientist presented at the conference, and she cited work 
on visual development in cats. He reflected, “I heard numerous wide-ranging policy 
recommendations based on the new brain science. Yet, I had heard relatively little brain research 
... and none that provided a clear link between blind kittens and welfare reform”22. 
 
A roughly contemporaneous project was the landmark book, ‘From Neurons to 
Neighborhoods’125, whose title also seemed to promise a neuroscience–policy integration. Based 
on a National Academy of Sciences collaboration among scientists, child development and 
policy experts, the book contained an excellent chapter on brain development, alongside many 
other authoritative chapters on the psychology of children, families and communities. However, 
reflecting the state of the science of the time, there was little cross-referencing between the brain 
chapter and the others. 
 
It is tempting to view these early attempts at neuroscience–social policy integration as indicative 
of neuroscience ‘over-reach’. Indeed, a number of prominent voices have argued that 
neuroscience is being oversold as an approach to diverse societal problems23,126,127,128. In 
addition, the ‘seductive allure of neuroscience’, a term coined by Weisberg and colleagues129, 
describes the tendency of laypersons to be persuaded by neuroscience, even when it is 
nonsensical. Although these critics describe many valid examples of neuroscience over-reach, I 
believe that it would be a mistake to paint all attempts to develop nonmedical applications of 
neuroscience with the same broad brush. And, although the seductive allure of neuroscience is a 
real phenomenon, so is the ‘seductive allure of seductive allure’130, which has created its own 
legacy of uncritical denigration of neuroscience, especially neuroimaging. 
 
Furthermore, although there is no guarantee that progress in neuroscience will help us understand 
socioeconomic status (SES) and its life-course correlates, it seems highly likely that it will. Why 
would a fuller understanding of any problem, couched at any applicable level of explanation – 
physical, biological, psychological, economic, social or political – not be an asset when trying to 
solve the problem? In this very minimal way, at least, the neuroscience of SES is relevant to the 
design of poverty policy. Poverty has measurable neural correlates, for which neuroscience 
offers potential causal accounts, and this establishes the potential for policy relevance. As 
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modest a claim as this is, I believe that it bears stating explicitly as counterpoint to recent 
criticisms of neuroscience over-reach. 
 
Figure 1 Trends in health and cognitive outcomes across levels of SES, and in SES neuroscience 
publications across time.  a-c| Socioeconomic status is related to many important life outcomes, 
including physical health and longevity, mental health and wellbeing, and cognitive ability. 
Three illustrative findings are shown here. a| Estimated remaining life expectancy in 2005, for 25 
year old Americans with different levels of educational attainment. b| Relationship between 
household income and the percentage of individuals that report symptoms similar to those of a 
mood disorder in Canada in 2014. c| Relationship between family income and average scores on 
the US Scholastic Aptitude Test in 2013. d| The neuroscience of SES has recently become an 
active area of research. This is reflected in the number of publications on this topic since the 
beginning of the century. The chart shows publications between 2000 and 2017, identified by 
searching titles and abstracts in PubMed for the five terms ‘socioeconomic’, ‘socioeconomic 
status’, ‘SES’, ‘income’ and ‘poverty’, combined with eighteen neuroscience terms including 
‘MRI’, ‘DTI’, ‘EEG’, ‘grey matter’, ‘cortical’, ‘prefrontal’ and ‘default mode’, and eliminating 
articles with the terms ‘schizophrenia’, ‘breast’, ‘injury’ and ‘disease’. Part a, adapted from 
Rostron, Boies & Arias131. Panel b adapted from Canadian Community Health Survey, 2014. 
Ottawa, ON: Statistics Canada. Panel c adapted from College Board, 2013. 
 
 
Author notes
Please check these figures carefully and return any comments/amendments that you might have to 
me as soon as possible. In particular, we would like you to check the following:
 
• Do the figures convey the intended message?
• Are all the labels accurate and in the right place?
• Are all the arrows in the right place?
• Are any chemical structures correct?
• Have shapes and colours been used consistently and accurately throughout the figures?
• Have any of the figures been previously published, or have they been supplied by a colleague(s) 
who is not a named author on the article?
To mark up any corrections, please use the commenting tools in the PDF, or print and draw by hand, 
rather than directly editing the PDFs.
Fig 1
To make a thin space (5pt text) to either side of a
math symbol or before units, you can use the subscript 
or superscript Action to easily make the 5pt text .
For any Greeks in a ﬁgure you can use Symbol Std font rather than 
Minion Pro. On a Mac, you can’t turn standard letters (abg) into 
their Greek counterparts (αβγ) just by applying the font because 
the characters are in diﬀerent parts of the font set. You have to 
use the Glyphs palette to choose the Greeks. Do it like this:
• With the Text cursor in position and no text selected
• Use the Action Cmd+4 to set the font to Symbol Std
• In the Glyphs palette double-click the Greek character you want
• If you want a Minion Pro glyph then change the font. 
• The reason for setting the font to Symbol Std rather than Minion 
Pro is because the character set for is much smaller and therefore 
easier to ﬁnd the Greek letter you want.
Nature Reviews | Neuroscience
a b
c d
0 0
16
14
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
Li
fe
 e
xp
ec
ta
nc
y 
(y
ea
rs
)
Le
ss 
th
an
 hi
gh
sc
ho
ol 
gr
ad
ua
te
Hi
gh
 sc
ho
ol
gr
ad
ua
te
So
me
 co
lle
ge
Co
lle
ge
 gr
ad
ua
te
Gr
ad
ua
te
 de
gr
ee
Education level
Pe
rc
en
t d
ep
re
ss
ed
12
10
8
6
4
2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Income decile
Sc
or
e
0–
20
,00
0
20
,00
0–
40
,00
0
40
,00
0–
60
,00
0
60
,00
0–
80
,00
0
80
,00
0–
10
0,0
00
10
0,0
00
–1
20
,00
0
12
0,0
00
–1
40
,00
0
14
0,0
00
–1
60
,00
0
16
0,0
00
–2
00
,00
0
M
or
e t
ha
n 2
00
,00
0
Family income
Year
Reading WritingMathematics
N
um
be
r o
f p
ub
lic
at
io
ns
20
00
–2
00
2
20
03
–2
00
5
20
06
–2
00
8
20
09
–2
01
1
20
12
–2
01
4
20
15
–2
01
7
Nature Reviews | Neuroscience
[PERSPECTIVE] Farah NRN-16-071 23|03|18
